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I.     Introduction
Alarming average temperature increases of 
the Earth’s surface and oceans have prompted global 
action to curtail the human population’s impact on 
climate change.1  Increases in global temperatures 
will significantly impact water resources, food 
security, coastal regions, biological ecosystems, and 
human health.2  Climate fluctuations will likely 
increase the frequency and intensity of extreme 
weather phenomenon such as severe storms, floods, 
and droughts.3  Weather and regional temperature 
changes could harm agricultural land and ecosystems, 
spread disease, and irreparably damage health and 
food security in many regions throughout the world.4  
Predictions also foretell of irreversible ice cap melting, 
the sea level rising, and mass flooding of coastal regions 
– displacing portions of the human population.5 
Strong scientific evidence has determined 
that human production of “greenhouse gases” are the 
primary culprit in trapping heat, leading to global 
warming over the last half century.6  Greenhouse gases 
in the atmosphere like carbon dioxide (CO2), methane 
(CH4), and nitrous oxide (N2O) absorb, scatter, and 
emit energy that would otherwise be radiated into 
space, resulting in a net warming of the Earth.7    The 
large quantities of greenhouse gases emitted during 
human energy production, e.g., by burning coal or oil, 
have exacerbated this phenomenon beyond its natural 
1.  See Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 
[IPCC] Plenary XXVII, Climate Change 2007: Synthesis 
Report (November 2007) [hereinafter IPCC Plenary XXVII].
2.  See id. at 51.
3.  See id. at 53.
4.  See id. at 48-53. “Sea level rise is expected to exacerbate 
inundation, storm surge, erosion and other coastal hazards, thus 
threatening vital infrastructure, settlements and facilities that 
support the livelihood of island communities.”  Id. at 52. “Increased 
risk of extreme high sea level” is predicted to be likely causing and 
“potential for movement of populations and infrastructure” and 
“migration-related health effects.” Id. at 53.
5.  See id.
6.  Id. at 39.
7.  See id. at 36-37 (“The atmospheric concentrations of 
CO2 and CH4 in 2005 exceed by far the natural range over the 
last 650,000 years. Global increases in CO2 concentrations are 
due primarily to fossil fuel use, with land-use change providing 
another significant but smaller contribution. It is very likely that the 
observed increase in CH4 concentration is predominantly due to 
agriculture and fossil fuel use. The increase in N2O concentration is 
primarily due to agriculture.”).
degree, despite being a normal and partially necessary 
process to keep the Earth habitable.8  Anthropogenic 
warming over the last three decades has likely had 
a global influence  on many physical and biological 
systems.9  In response, scientists and engineers have 
developed “clean” technologies to significantly decrease 
greenhouse gas emissions.  Clean technologies are 
designed to mitigate climate change with solutions 
ranging from carbon capture and energy-efficient 
devices to renewable energy sources and hybrid 
technologies.
In addition to environmental concerns, 
the world’s governments have recognized that its 
current modus operandi of energy production is not 
sustainable.10  The world’s energy production, largely 
based on fossil fuels, will inevitably come to an end 
as the supply of those fuels dwindles.  Spawned by 
the gas shortage of the 1970s and reinforced by the 
oil price spikes of the past decade, concerns over 
our dependence on fossil fuels has driven scientists, 
economists, and politicians to call for a transition to 
sustainable forms of energy production.11  Sustainable 
or “renewable” energy sources include mainly solar, 
wind, hydro/marine, geothermal, and biomass.  
Renewable energy technologies are designed to harness 
and convert these naturally occurring forms of energy 
into electricity and other usable forms of power.  These 
clean technologies have the benefit of being based on 
virtually limitless resources while significantly reducing 
environmental impact with minimal production of 
greenhouse gases.  In addition to renewable energy 
technologies, adaptation and mitigation technologies 
can help minimize the impact from greenhouse gases 
generated by traditional forms of energy generation.  
Though mitigation and adaptation technologies 
are unable to prevent all climate change, they can 
substantially reduce the rate and magnitude of such 
8.  Id.
9.  Id. at 41.
10.  See generally Energy Independence and Security Act of 
2007, Pub. L. No. 110-140, 121 Stat. 1492 (2007) (intending 
to increase the production of clean renewable fuels, to increase 
the efficiency, to promote research on and deploy greenhouse gas 
capture); Council Directive 2009/28, 2009 O.J. (L140) (EC) 
(promoting of the use of energy from renewable sources in the 
European Union).
11.  Id.; See also Daniel Kammen, Renewable Energy in U.S. 
Foreign Policy, 36 Golden Gate U. L. Rev. 327 (2006).
The Role of Patents in the International Framework of Clean Technology 
Transfer: A Discussion of Barriers and Solutions
by Mark Consilvio
8 Summer 2011
change.12  All of these clean technology solutions are 
an essential component in combating climate change.13  
Despite these advances and given current climate 
change mitigation policies and sustainable development 
practices, global greenhouse gas emissions will continue 
to grow over the next few decades.14 
 First, this paper will address the current 
intergovernmental legal framework relating to climate 
change and the international transfer of climate change 
mitigation and adaptation technologies.15  Second, the 
paper will discuss some of the perceived barriers and 
possible solutions surrounding international technology 
transfer.  Finally, the paper suggests an optimal solution 
based on the current international framework and 
evidence of technology transfer barriers.  A goal of this 
paper is to show that the global intellectual property 
regime should be part of a solution and not a barrier to 
international technology transfer. 
II.   United Nation Framework Convention on 
Climate Change
The 1992 United Nation Framework 
Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC)16 came 
into force in 1994 as a global initiative to stabilize 
greenhouse gas concentration in the atmosphere.17  The 
UNFCCC has been ratified by countries representing 
almost all global producers of greenhouse gas 
emissions.18 The stated objectives of the UNFCCC 
include: allowing the ecosystem to adapt, ensuring 
food production, and creating sustainable economic 
development.19  The UNFCCC states that developed 
countries should bear the primary financial burden in 
12.  Id.at 65.
13.  International Centre for Trade and Sustainable 
Development [ICTSD], Climate Change, Technology 
Transfer and Intellectual Property Rights: Background 
Paper 1 (August 2008) [hereinafter ICTSD Background Paper].
14.  IPCC Plenary XXVII, supra note 1, at 44.
15.  This transfer of clean technologies is traditionally 
viewed from the perspective of developed nations – whereby 
developed nations are seen as inventors of clean technologies and 
developing nations are seen as needing those inventions as their 
energy production increases.  Some evidence presented in this 
paper contradicts this paradigm – particularly regarding emerging 
economies.
16.  The leading international treaty establishing a Secretariat 
to consider what can be done to reduce global warming and to cope 
with whatever temperature increases are inevitable.
17.  U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change 
Art. 2, May 9, 1992, 1771 U.N.T.S. 107 [hereinafter UNFCCC].  
18.  See Greenhouse Gas Inventory Data, UNFCCC,  http://
ghg.unfccc.int/index.html (last visited Aug. 10, 2011) (containing 
data estimating the levels of greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions 
for members to the TRIPS Agreement); K.Ravi Srinivas, Climate 
Change, Technology Transfer and Intellectual Property Rights 30, 
Research and Information System for Developing Countries (2009).
19.  Id. 
achieving these objectives.20  
The developed country Parties and 
other developed Parties … shall take 
all practicable steps to promote, 
facilitate and finance, as appropriate, 
the transfer of, or access to, 
environmentally sound technologies 
and know-how to other Parties, 
particularly developing country 
Parties, to enable them to implement 
the provisions of the Convention.21
The U.N. Conference on Trade and Development 
describes the “transfer of technology” as the 
communication of “systematic knowledge for the 
manufacture of a product, for the application of 
a process or for the rendering of a service,” which 
“does not extend to the transactions involving the 
mere sale or mere lease of goods.”22  The knowledge 
should include all of the “entrepreneurial expertise and 
professional know-how” needed to commercialize the 
technology.23  
 The third annual Conference of Parties 
(COP) of the UNFCCC adopted the Kyoto Protocol 
which, inter alia, set emission limits for the parties.24  
Subsequent to agreement on the Kyoto Protocol, the 
patent world saw a dramatic rise in the patenting of 
clean technologies.25  This reaction suggests that further 
restrictions on carbon emissions would alter the clean 
technology landscape by increasing the demand for 
clean technologies, thereby driving innovation through 
the patent system. 
In addition to emissions reduction goals, 
the UNFCCC has spawned a variety of technology 
transfer mechanisms.  The Kyoto Protocol introduced 
20.  UNFCCC, supra note 17, at Art. 3.1, 4.3. 
21.  UNFCCC, supra note 17, at Art. 4.5.
22.  U.N. Conference on Trade and Development 
[UNCTAD], UNCTAD Series on Issues in International 
Investment Agreements 5-6 (2001), available at http://www.
unctad.org/en/docs//psiteiitd28.en.pdf.
23.  See id. (importing and reselling of a good in a particular 
country is not alone sufficient to constitute actual transfer of 
technology because it involves only the good and not the knowledge 
to create it.).
24.  Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change , Conference of the Parties, 3d 
Session, U.N. Doc. FCCC/CP/1997/L.7/Add.1 (Dec. 11, 1997) 
[hereinafter Kyoto Protocol]; See United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change, Conference of the Parties, 
Fifteenth Session, Dec. 7-19, 2009, Copenhagen, Den. U.N. Doc. 
FCCC/CP/2009/11/Add.1 (Mar. 30, 2010) [hereinafter COP-15].   
25.  U.N. Environment Programme, European Patent 
Office [EPO], and ICTSD, Patents and clean energy: 
bridging the gap between evidence and policy: Final report, 
8 (2010) [hereinafter EPO report].
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emissions trading, establishing a “carbon market” based 
on emission reduction units (ERUs).26 In addition 
to trading ERUs, a clean development mechanism 
and joint implementation plan enables countries 
to meet their emissions reduction targets, stimulate 
sustainable development, and encourage contributions 
from developing countries and the private sector.27 
But developing countries view these mechanisms as 
inadequate to fulfill the UNFCCC commitments of 
developed nations.28
The Kyoto Protocol is set to expire in 2012 
and efforts to continue or expand its emission 
restrictions have largely failed.29  A deadline to settle 
on a new emissions framework was set for the fifteenth 
COP session in Copenhagen, Denmark in 2009, 
but negotiations did not produce an agreement.30  
The Copenhagen Accord did establish a Technology 
Mechanism “to accelerate technology development 
and transfer in support of action on adaptation and 
mitigation that will be guided by a country-driven 
approach and be based on national circumstances 
and priorities.”31  Many aspects of the Technology 
Mechanism are still unsettled, but countries might 
be more likely to agree on clean technology transfer 
mechanisms than on quantitative emissions reductions 
that might stimulate clean technology transfer. 
III.   Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of  
Intellectual Property
The Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects 
of Intellectual Property (TRIPS Agreement) created 
minimum standards and a moderate amount of 
harmonization for intellectual property (IP) laws across 
the globe.32  The treaty ensures that the intellectual 
26.  Kyoto Protocol, supra note 24; The Mechanisms under the 
Kyoto Protocol: Emissions Trading, the Clean Development Mechanism 
and Joint Implementation, UNFCCC, http://unfccc.int/kyoto_
protocol/mechanisms/items/1673.php (last visited Aug. 10, 2011) 
(detailing each mechanism).  See Anita M. Halvorssen, International 
Law And Sustainable Development -- Tools For Addressing Climate 
Change, 39 Denv. J. Int’l L. & Pol’y 397, 416 (2011).
27.  Id.
28.  EPO report, supra note 25, at 19; Srinivas, supra note 18, 
at 1.
29.  COP-15, supra note 24; Daniel Bodansky, The 
Copenhagen Climate Change Conference: A Postmortem, 104 Am. J. 
Int’l L. 230, 230 (2010). The Copenhagen Accord being only a 
political statement is devoid of legal force to replace or extend the 
Kyoto Protocol.
30.  Bodansky, supra note 29.
31.  COP-15, supra note 24.
32.  TRIPS: Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of 
Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh 
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C, 
THE LEGAL TEXTS: THE RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY 
ROUND OF MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS 
320 (1999), 1869 U.N.T.S. 299, 33 I.L.M. 1197 (1994) available 
property rights (IPRs) of each member state do not 
favor one nation over another or favor a nation’s own 
citizens over foreign inventors.33  These requirements 
promote facial neutrality of IP laws, but may not 
address the inherent imbalance of IP power between 
developed and developing nations.34  This imbalance 
may be difficult to reconcile with the objectives and 
principles of the TRIPS Agreement.  Article 7 of the 
TRIPS Agreement states that IPRs “should contribute 
… to the transfer and dissemination of technology” and 
Article 8 recommends “[a]ppropriate measures . . . to 
prevent the abuse of intellectual property rights by right 
holders or the resort to practices which . . . adversely 
affect the international transfer of technology.”35  In 
particular, Article 66.2 requires developed countries 
to provide incentives to their local enterprises and 
institutions to promote and encourage technology 
transfer to the least-developed countries (LDCs).36  
However, the degree of success of any technology 
transfer under the TRIPS Agreement is still unclear, 
and concerns are growing that mechanisms designed 
to encourage technology transfers to LDCs have been 
ineffective.37
Despite the specific provisions on technology 
transfer, the heart of the TRIPS Agreement is the 
protection of IPRs.38  The underlying policy is based on 
the perspective that IPRs are fully protected as private 
commercial property and technology transfer is best 
achieved through competitive market conditions.39  
Thus, the treaty actually signifies a shift from 
emphasizing regulation of technology transfers in the 
interest of the developing country towards a more open 
market-based model.  An open market-based model 
encourages technology transfer to developing countries 
through the operation of the free market, coupled with 
assistance and cooperation on the part of developed 
countries.40  
IV.   Intellectual Property Divide
How IPRs function in the technology transfer 
process has become increasingly important.41  IPRs 
at http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/trips_e/t_agm0_e.htm 
[hereinafter TRIPS Agreement]. 
33.  Id. at arts. 3, 4. 
34.  Cynthia Cannady, Issue Paper No. 25: Access to Climate 
Change Technology by Developing Countries, ICTSD Programme on 
IPRs and Sustainable Development (2009).
35.  TRIPS Agreement, supra note 32, at arts. 7, 8.2.
36.  TRIPS Agreement, supra note 32, at art. 66.2.
37.  ICTSD Background Paper, supra note 13, at 3.
38.  UNCTAD Series on Issues in International 
Investment Agreements, supra note 22, at 63. 
39.  Id.
40.  Id. at 63-64.
41.  EPO report, supra note 25, at 19.
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are not expressly mentioned in the UNFCCC or the 
Kyoto Protocol, but prior to the UNFCCC COP-13 
session held in Bali, several developing countries like 
Cuba, India, Indonesia, Tanzania, and China stressed 
the need to address the role of IP in the climate change 
discussion.42  The subsequent Bali Action Plan suggests 
consideration of:
Effective mechanisms and enhanced 
means for the removal of obstacles 
to, and provision of financial and 
other incentives for, scaling up of the 
development and transfer of technology 
to developing country Parties in 
order to promote access to affordable 
environmentally sound technologies.43 
The UNFCCC parties disagree on whether IPRs are an 
obstacle that impede effective technology transfer and 
if so, what measures should be taken.44  Developing 
countries, like China, have argued that patents are 
an obstacle to clean technology transfer because 
patents limit a country’s access to clean technologies.45  
Conversely, the United States has expressly opposed 
any weakening of IPRs related to clean technologies.46  
The divide over IPRs has delayed agreement among 
UNFCCC parties concerning clean technology 
transfer.47  
V.   Patents and Technology Transfer
All IPRs, particularly patent rights, do not have 
equal potential to inhibit technology transfer across 
all developing nations.48  Research by Copenhagen 
Economics suggests that patent filings in clean 
technology sectors are almost nonexistent in the least 
developed countries.49  The research data showed that 
only 0.1 percent of the 215,000 patent applications 
for certain clean technologies were filed in LDCs.50  If 
a particular technology is not patented in a particular 
42.  ICTSD Background Paper, supra note 13, at 4.
43.  United Nations Framework Convention on Climate 
Change, Conference of the Parties, Thirteenth Session, Dec. 3-15, 
2007; COP-13 in Bali, Indon. U.N. Doc. FCCC/CP/2007/6/
Add.1 (Mar. 14, 2008).
44.  ICTSD Background Paper, supra note 13, at 2.
45.  Lisa Larrimore Ouellette, Addressing the Green Patent 
Global Deadlock through Bayh-Dole Reform, 119 Yale L.J. 1727, 
1727 (2010).
46.  Id. at 1728.
47.  Id.
48.  Copenhagen Econ. A/S & the IPR Co. ApS, Are IPR 
a Barrier to the Transfer of Climate Change Technology? (2009) 
(amassing research from several independent sources) [hereinafter 
Copenhagen Economics].
49.  Id.
50.  EPO report, supra note 25, at 22.
country, anyone in that country can use the disclosed 
technology for its benefit.  Therefore, patents are 
unlikely to be a barrier in LDCs.
However, countries with emerging economies 
have significant numbers of patents in clean technology 
sectors.  One study showed that China ranked second 
among leading innovators in climate-friendly cement 
and geothermal energy.51  The Republic of Korea 
ranked second for patents in energy-efficient lighting 
and Russia ranked third for patents in carbon-capture 
and storage, climate-friendly cement, and geothermal 
energy.52  Other studies mentioned in a joint report by 
the European Patent Office, the U.N. Environment 
Programme, and the International Centre for Trade 
and Sustainable Development, have provided similar 
evidence that patents are important in many emerging 
economies and should be considered in the clean 
technology transfer debate as a possible barrier.53  But 
the existence of significant quantities of patents in 
emerging economies does not resolve the issue of 
whether patents are a barrier to clean technology 
transfer.
Technical information is costly to learn 
and absorb for endogenous commercialization.54  
Technology owners with IPRs may theoretically 
demand prices that are higher than marginal cost or 
may monopolize markets.55  The high concentration of 
equivalent clean technologies found in a small number 
of companies56 increases the risk of anti-competitive 
behavior.57  Anti-competitive practices are always a 
danger in intellectual property regimes and threaten 
to inhibit innovation in any market – developed 
or developing.  Some corporations could engage in 
patent “blocking,” a strategy whereby patent owners 
deter competitors from entering the market because 
of the costs associated with trying to invent in the 
neighborhood of patents.58  However, the fungible 
nature of energy production and maturity of many 
51.  Id.
52.  Id.
53.  Id. at 22-23; Srinivas, supra note 18.
54.  Keith E. Maskus, Issue Paper No. 7: Encouraging 
International Technology Transfer, in UNCTAD -ICTSD Project 
on IPRs and Sustainable Development § 2.2(a) (2004).
55.  Id. at § 2.2(c).
56.  EPO report, supra note 25, at 64.
57.  Frederick M. Abbott, Issue Paper No. 24: Innovation 
and Technology Transfer to Address Climate Change: Lessons from 
the Global Debate on Intellectual Property and Public Health, 
Intellectual Property and Sustainable Development Series, 
ICTSD Programme on IPRs and Sustainable Development § 
3 (2009).
58.  Benjamin K. Sovacool, Placing a Glove on the Invisible 
Hand: How Intellectual Property Rights May Impede Innovation in 
Energy Research and Development (R&D), 18 Alb. L.J. Sci. & Tech. 
381, 419-20.
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clean technologies decrease the likelihood of a single 
blocking patent.59  Even in the biofuel sector, where 
avoiding patented microorganisms may be difficult, 
licensing of those patents is likely and royalties would 
not remain high for long.60  Other factors, such as lack 
of capital and know-how, may be larger impediments to 
technology transfer.61 
VI.   The Search for Balance
Though true technology transfer is not 
necessarily based on IPRs, IPRs have the potential to 
make technology transfer too costly and impractical 
with almost any innovation.  Most developing 
countries remain net consumers rather than donors 
of technology.62  Developing countries have a strong 
interest in expanding their access to international 
technologies.63  But not all developing countries have 
the same ability to learn from foreign technologies 
and absorb them into their domestic economy.64  
Emerging economies like China and Brazil have 
good investment potential and are likely to continue 
to gain technology through transfer to endogenous 
companies.65  LDCs, on the other hand, may find little 
foreign direct investment without improvements to skill 
levels, infrastructure, IP protection/enforcement, and 
increases in funding for transfers.66  At the international 
level, discussions to weaken IPRs have been recently 
proposed.  During the UNFCCC Ad Hoc Working 
Group on Long-Term Cooperative Action session in 
June of 2009, parties included provisions specifically 
addressing IPRs in the negotiating text: compulsory 
licensing for patented environmentally-sound 
technologies, mandatory exclusions from patenting 
for climate-friendly technologies held by developed 
countries, pooling and sharing of publicly funded 
technologies, and making the technologies available 
in the public domain at an affordable price or royalty-
free.67  None of these provisions were ultimately 
59.  Abbott, supra note 57, at § 3.
60.  John H. Barton, Issue Paper No. 2: Intellectual Property 
and Access to Clean Energy Technologies in Developing Countries: An 
Analysis of Solar Photovoltaic, Biofuel and Wind Technologies, ICTSD 
Programme on Trade and Environment (2007).
61.  See Marilyn Brown et al., U.S. Dep’t of Energy, Carbon 
Lock-In: Barriers To Deploying Climate change Mitigation Technologies 
(2007) (discussing barriers for U.S. companies) [hereinafter Carbon 
Lock-In].
62.  UNCTAD Series on Issues in International 
Investment Agreements, supra note 22, at 7.
63.  Maskus, supra note 54.
64.  Id.
65.  See id.
66.  Whether this deficiency is real or just perceived in all 
sectors remains unclear and warrants further study. See, e.g., Carbon 
Lock-in, supra note 61.
67.  U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change, Ad 
adopted, but they are an insight into the current 
discussion of IPRs in the climate change context.
VII.   Exclusions from Patentability
Patenting exclusions for clean technologies 
may be the most unlikely proposal to be adopted 
of all the ad hoc working group’s proposals leading 
up to the COP-15 in Copenhagen.  The provision 
allows countries to exclude applications for clean 
technology from patents and rescind patented clean 
technologies from patent protection.68 This rather 
extreme solution seems to directly conflict a provision 
of the TRIPS Agreement.  Article 27.1 of the TRIPS 
Agreement does not permit member states to exclude 
any field of technology as a whole from patentability.69 
However, the TRIPS Agreement does include certain 
“flexibilities” such as Articles 27.2 and 30.  Under 
Article 30: 
Members may provide limited 
exceptions to the exclusive rights 
conferred by a patent, provided that 
such exceptions do not unreasonably 
conflict with a normal exploitation of 
the patent and do not unreasonably 
prejudice the legitimate interests of the 
patent owner, taking account of the 
legitimate interests of third parties.70  
A member country could argue that clean technologies 
are a limited exception, but this idea may be very 
difficult to sell to a WTO dispute settlement panel.  
This exception has primarily been used to allow for 
academic research or experimental use by parties 
other than a patent holder.71 A more narrowly-tailored 
exception, such as an exception to a particular clean 
technology sector, might have a better chance under 
Article 30.  An exclusion of clean technology patents 
under Article 27.2 of the TRIPS Agreement also 
appears unlikely.  It states: 
Members may exclude from 
patentability inventions, the 
prevention within their territory of 
the commercial exploitation of which 
Hoc Working Group on Long-Term Coop. Action Under the 
Convention, Bonn F.R.G., June 1-12, 2009, Negotiating Text, pp. 
184, U.N. doc. FCCC/AWGL/2009/8 (May 19, 2009), available 
at http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2009/awglca6/eng/inf01.pdf 
[hereinafter Negotiating Text]. 
68.  Id. 
69.  TRIPS Agreement, supra note 32, at art. 27.1
70.  TRIPS Agreement, supra note 32, at art. 30.
71.  See, e.g., Panel Report, Canada – Patent Protections of 
Pharmaceutical Products, WT/DS114/R (Mar. 17, 2000).
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is necessary to protect ordre public or 
morality, including to protect human, 
animal or plant life or health or to avoid 
serious prejudice to the environment, 
provided that such exclusion is not 
made merely because the exploitation 
is prohibited by their law.72
It would be contradictory to argue that protecting 
health or avoiding serious prejudice to the environment 
would be furthered by the prevention of commercial 
exploitation of clean technologies, when clean 
technologies would be implemented precisely to protect 
health or avoid serious prejudice to the environment.   
At least in theory, parties to both the 
UNFCCC and the TRIPS Agreement could agree to 
concurrently amend the TRIPS Agreement, or agree 
not to enforce it in this regard, permiting abolishment 
of IPRs in clean technology sectors, but the risk of 
modifying the TRIPS Agreement should not be taken 
lightly.73  Given the breadth of clean technology sectors, 
the indefiniteness of what is encompassed by clean 
technology, and the current divisiveness on the issue, 
such a one-sided change seems far-fetched.74  Beyond 
the express unwillingness of developed nations to 
weaken patent protections, the lack of IPRs in the clean 
technology sectors might discourage clean technology 
transfer and impose a new barrier.
VIII.   Compulsory Licensing75
Along with the ad hoc working group’s 
proposed negotiating language, some non-
governmental organizations have advocated for 
compulsory licensing.76 The recipient country would 
issue a compulsory license by removing any royalty fees 
that an IPR holder might desire to charge.77 Instead 
of weakening IPRs across all clean technology sectors, 
a single invention could be licensed on its individual 
merits.  Such a policy seeks to prevent anti-competitive 
practices of IPR holders like hoarding.78  Compulsory 
licensing is available under Article 31 of the TRIPS 
Agreement79 and has been used in the past, such as in 
72.  TRIPS Agreement, supra note 32, at art. 27.2.
73.  ICTSD Background Paper, supra note 13, at 7.
74.  Abbott, supra note 57, at § 6(c).
75.  A compulsory licensing is a license a government grants 
to someone other than the patent owner to produce the patented 
product or process without the consent of the patent owner.
76.  EPO Report, supra note 25, at 14a.
77.  ICTSD Background Paper, supra note 13, at 6.
78.  UNCTAD Series on Issues in International 
Investment Agreements, supra note 22, at 38.
79.  TRIPS Agreement, supra note 32, at art. 31; ICTSD-
UNCTAD Capacity Building Project on IPRs and Sustainable 
Development, Resource Book on TRIPS and Development: An 
the pharmaceutical context.80 
However, the pharmaceutical sector is quite 
different from clean technology sectors.  A patented 
pharmaceutical is likely to be the exclusive solution to 
a particular need. Since there are usually no market 
alternatives to a patented pharmaceutical, the IPRs 
holder is able to charge large royalty fees.  Developing 
nations may not be able to afford the pharmaceutical, 
even if the country is in great need of it.  
Market competition in the area of clean 
technologies also differs in several ways from 
competition in the pharmaceuticals industry.  First, 
a study by John Barton demonstrates that a fair 
amount of competition exists in the studied clean 
technology sectors, keeping pricing to a minimum.81  
This competition exists across multiple alternative 
energy sectors.82  Also, many of the fundamental clean 
technological solutions have long been off-patent.83  
Second, though compulsory licensing 
is permitted under the TRIPS Agreement, other 
bilateral or multilateral agreements may restrict the 
licensing of clean technologies, except in cases of 
national emergency.  Also, compulsory licensing could 
potentially create an economic backlash.84 Therefore, 
compulsory licensing may not be desirable for every 
developing nation because of overarching consequences.
Finally, a license to a patented technology 
does not necessarily equate to a transfer of technology.  
Unlike a pharmaceutical patent, where disclosure of 
a chemical formula may be sufficient to produce the 
product, a clean technology patent may not disclose 
enough information to actually commercialize the 
technology.85  Trade secrets or technical know-how 
might be required and would be beyond the disclosure 
of the patent.  In the pharmaceutical sector, a chemical 
formula may be sufficient for a manufacturer in a 
developing nation to produce a drug, and a compulsory 
license might be sufficient knowledge to permit 
manufacture.  But in clean technology sectors, the 
inventions may require more skill or knowledge to 
authoritative and practical guide to the TRIPS Agreement, at 
461, available at: http://www.iprsonline.org/unctadictsd/
ResourceBookIndex.htm (June 1, 2005) [hereinafter Book on 
TRIPS].
80.  William W. Fisher III & Dr. Cyrill P. Rigamonti, Harvard 
Law School, The South Africa AIDS Controversy A Case Study in 
Patent Law and Policy 12-13 (2005), available at http://cyber.law.
harvard.edu/people/tfisher/South%20Africa.pdf. 
81.  Barton, supra note 60.
82.  Id.
83.  Id. The term “off-patent” refers to technologies which 
have out-lived their patent terms.
84.  Robert Fair, Does Climate Change Justify Compulsory 
Licensing of Green Technology?, 6 B.Y.U. Int’l L. & Mgmt. Rev. 21, 
25 (2009).
85.  Srinivas, supra note 18, at 16-17, 27.
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produce.  
For example, a solar photovoltaic (PV) cell 
might be protected by multiple patents and trade 
secrets.  The particular compositions of the layers of 
a p-n junction might be patented, but the method of 
obtaining the desired precision engineering of those 
layers might be a trade secret.  Without the ability 
to precisely produce those layers, the true efficiency 
gain of the cell might never be realized.  Therefore, 
a compulsory license may be insufficient for actual 
transfer of the clean technology, since it would 
only disclose part of the technology.86  Additional 
components, perhaps covered by other patents and 
possibly owned by other companies, may be necessary 
for implementation of the PV cell.  A compulsory 
license to one component of the PV cell may not 
be useful without the other components.  Finally, it 
should be noted that developing countries present 
other barriers that may be greater obstacles than IPRs.  
Absence of a sufficient technological infrastructure, an 
underdeveloped domestic industry and R&D base, or 
poor access to production materials will undermine any 
gains of the compulsory license. 
IX.   Patent Pools
Another proposed technology transfer 
mechanism involves patent pooling, the sharing of 
clean technology at “affordable prices” or possibly 
“royalty-free.”87  It is unclear from the Ad Hoc Working 
Group negotiating text whether this sharing of clean 
technology is voluntary or mandatory.  If voluntary, it 
may be similar to the current Eco-Patent Commons.88  
The Eco-Patent Commons has made some in-roads into 
sharing technology, but the only significant incentive 
for a business to submit patents to the Commons is for 
a business to improve how the public perceives it. This 
incentive is not strong enough for inventors to share 
their best or complete technological advances.89  
86.  Additionally, PV cells supply direct current and require 
converters to switch to an alternating current to use the electricity 
from a home.  Further, PV cells are dependent on direct sunlight 
and must be coupled to batteries or allow for connection to a 
traditional power grid during low light hours.  
87.  Negotiating Text, supra note 67. 
88.  The Eco-Patent Commons was launched by IBM, Nokia, 
Pitney Bowes and Sony in partnership with the World Business 
Council for Sustainable Development (WBCSD) and was founded 
on the commitment that anyone who wants to bring environmental 
benefits to market can use these patents to protect the environment 
and enable collaboration between businesses that foster new 
innovations. World Business Council for Sustainable 
Development (WBCSD), http://www.wbcsd.org (last visited Aug. 
10, 2011).
89.  Cannady, supra note 34, at 11 (addressing the limits 
of patent pools); But see Andrew Boynton, Eco-Patent Commons: 
A Donation Approach Encouraging Innovation Within The Patent 
If submission to a patent pool were 
mandatory, disputes might arise over remuneration 
because of the inherent difficulty of assessing what 
might be “affordable,” or assessing the worth of 
individual components of a device. For example, if the 
manufacture of a solar panel involved multiple patents 
with different assignees, would remuneration be split 
equally among the assignees or split according to some 
determined percentage of contribution?
Despite the problems associated with pooling 
patents, packaging IP rights together with the know-
how to implement an invention may be necessary in 
the LDCs and in emerging economies.  A portion 
of the negotiating text does address “associated trade 
secrets and know-how on environmentally sound 
technologies and enable them to be accessed.”90 
Hence, the patent pooling provision actually has 
an advantage over compulsory licensing in that it 
is more closely linked to transfer of technology and 
not just circumvention of IPRs.  Also, developing 
nations would gain a better sense of the total cost of 
manufacture with a decreased risk of some unknown 
element impeding commercialization.
X.   A Proposed Solution
The role of IPRs in the climate change 
context is both complex and controversial.  As 
noted above, clean technologies encompass a wide 
variety of technologies – each with unique market 
conditions.91 While virtually all nations might agree 
that climate change is a serious problem, the views of 
individual nations on intellectual property and climate 
change diverge.92 These divergent positions may be 
irreconcilable if each country does not see an economic 
benefit to compromise.  The fear of global warming and 
the recognition of an unsustainable energy policy may 
not be compelling enough to evoke a change to the IP 
system at the international level.  
A.   Green Technology Packages
 A successful mechanism to promote IP 
in developing countries will require a multi-level 
approach – technology packages and coordination on 
an international level, as well as incentives and removal 
of barriers at the national level.  At the international 
level, the idea of new Patent Commons by the Japan 
Intellectual Property Association or “green technology 
packages”93 by Honda show the kind of promise lacking 
System, 35 Wm. & Mary Envtl. L. & Pol’y Rev. 659, 676 (2011).
90.  Negotiating Text, supra note 67. 
91.  See infra Part V.
92.  See infra Part IV.
93.  A “package” would comprise sets of patents, 
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from the earlier altruistic treaties bent on combating 
climate change.94  
A green technology package can gather 
knowledge beyond the information contained in 
a patent’s specification – knowledge which may be 
necessary for true technology transfer.  A patent 
is granted to an inventor as an exclusive right, in 
exchange for the inventor’s public disclosure of how 
to make or use the invention. U.S. patent law requires 
a written description of the invention sufficient 
to teach one of ordinary skill in the art of how to 
make or use the invention.95  In practice, this public 
disclosure may not provide the necessary know-how 
to efficiently commercialize the invention.  The ability 
to make a single product does not necessarily equate 
to the ability manufacture a sufficient quantity to 
be commercially viable.  Also, a patent application 
is written for “one of ordinary skill in the art.”96  So 
those wishing to make or use the invention may need 
to gain substantial knowledge in the field of endeavor.  
Additionally, the patent examination process has no 
physical means of determining whether the disclosure 
is, in fact, adequate to make the invention 97  As a 
result, there is no guarantee that even one of ordinary 
skill in the art will have sufficient knowledge to make 
or use the invention.98  Further, patent applications 
can be drawn to individual components or aspects 
of a product or process, and the law does not require 
that all elements be disclosed so long as the claimed 
invention is substantially useful.99  Instead of protecting 
the entire invention under one patent, companies may 
protect different aspects of an invention as trade secrets 
or under separate patents.  All this has the effect to 
decoupling the knowledge disclosed by a patent and the 
knowledge needed for transfer of technology.
As noted above with patent pools, green 
technology packages have a distinct advantage 
over compulsory licensing because they are able to 
provide the knowledge necessary to commercialize an 
invention.  The green technology package can include 
additional knowledge beyond the scope of a patent, 
such as technical information, human resource plans, 
and skills training. The green technology package can 
documentation, and other IP and non-IP knowledge gathered 
together to facilitate commercialization.
94.  Cannady, supra note 34, at 19.
95.  35 U.S.C. § 112 (2006). 
96.  Id.
97.  For over a century the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office 
has not required a working model an invention to grant a patent.  
98.  Srinivas, supra note 18, at 26.  However, a patent may be 
invalidated by a U.S. federal court on the grounds practicing the 
invention requires knowledge beyond the level of one of ordinary 
skill in the art.
99.  See 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2006).
group multiple patents together so that the potential 
licensee does not need to negotiate separate licenses.  
For example, a PV cell, converter, and battery might be 
grouped together under this green technology package. 
This grouping would alleviate the difficulty of shopping 
for each component, which may be a significant 
undertaking if the potential licensee is unfamiliar with 
the technology.  Also, the potential licensee would be 
able to project a more accurate business model, since 
the package provides a one-stop shop.
Another advantage of green technology 
packages is that pricing can be easily compared to 
among packages.  Newly patented technologies must 
still compete with older, off-patent technologies.  A 
green technology package allows flexible pricing to 
adjust to the demand and position of each technology 
area.  Wind, PV, and biofuel all have a small number 
of market members, but high levels of competition.  
Analysis shows that strong competition among wind, 
PV, and biofuel manufacturers has kept licensing prices 
down.100  For example, a Chinese firm, Goldwind, 
licensed wind technology from a German firm for 
a 1% royalty.101  Presumably a green technology 
package would also be competitively priced to attract 
developing nations.102
Based on an EPO licensing survey, there is 
little overall out-licensing to developing countries 
in clean technology sectors, which is on par with 
other industries.103 This suggests that current clean 
technology transfer mechanisms have failed to 
appreciably promote out-licensing.  One possible 
reason for the under-licensing is the failure of 
licensors to communicate with potential licensees.  
Based on the submissions by developing countries 
of their technology needs assessments (TNAs) to 
the Global Environment Facility (GEF), developing 
countries may not be aware of the technical solutions 
available throughout the world.104 The EPO has 
added a new classification scheme to enhance global 
awareness of patented and non-patented solutions in 
clean technology sectors.105 But perhaps there is an 
opportunity to match the needs of developing countries 
(identified by the TNAs) and the actual patent owners 
– or better yet green technology package owners.
100.  Barton, supra note 60, at 4.
101.  Id. (Wind, having the lowest competition of the three 
sectors, would normally have the highest royalties).
102.  Developing countries may also be able to draw from 
public funds.
103.  EPO Report, supra note 25, at 64.
104.  Handbook for Conducting Technology Needs 
Assessment for Climate Change 20, 21 (Sarwat Chowdhury et al. 
eds., 2010) (directing countries implementing a technology needs 
assessment to ClimateTechWiki designed to inform them about 
different technology options).
105.  EPO Report, supra note 25, at 65.
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A recent draft by the Expert Group on 
Technology Transfer concerning the Technology 
Mechanism of the Copenhagen Accord envisions 
a Climate Technology Centre (CTC) that would 
function as network hub and facilitator, technical 
advisor and consultant, matchmaker, catalyst, broker, 
and technology accelerator.106 A body such as the CTC 
might be used to link a demand in developing nations 
for a particular clean technology to a provider of such 
technology, bridging the gap between the two entities.  
Such a body would be in a position to alleviate legal 
issues in licensing by pre-negotiating and funding 
issues through the UNFCCC’s financial mechanisms.  
The CTC would be in a unique position to not only 
determine suitable matches for technology transfer 
but also to drive innovation by informing technology 
developers of the needs of potential developing country 
customers.
B. National Incentives
 But even if a technology is available for 
license, complete with know-how and a business 
model matched to a developing country, that country 
may lack the infrastructure or economic disposition 
necessary for implementation.  For example, a wind 
turbine design might be licensed with all the knowledge 
necessary for manufacturing the turbine, but if the 
developing country’s local power grid cannot handle 
the fluctuation in energy production inherent to the 
fluctuation of the winds themselves, the technology 
may be worthless.  Similarly, national subsidies for 
fossil fuels may provide an insurmountable barrier to 
a moderately priced solar field.  Therefore, a national 
level of transfer mechanisms will be required to 
counteract such internal barriers.
Research companies in developed countries 
need to coordinate with their governments in order 
to spur sufficient competition and keep pricing low 
for green technology packages.  Since most clean 
technology research is publicly funded, submission of 
a green technology package for each commercialized 
clean technology could be a requirement to receive 
public funds.  At the very least, countries like the 
United States may have to modify existing laws 
such as the Bayh-Dole Act, which favors licensing 
to firms that manufacture primarily in the United 
106.  United Nations Framework Convention on Climate 
Change, Preparing for the Implementation of the Proposed Technology 
Mechanism (Expert Group on Technology Transfer, Working 
Paper EGTT/2010/13, Nov. 4, 2010), available at http://unfccc.
int/ttclear/jsp/EGTTDoc/EGTT_Modalities_draft_working_
paper_4%20November.pdf. See United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change, Subsidiary Body for Scientific & 
Technological Advice, U.N. Doc. FCCC/SBSTA/2002/L.9 (June 
12, 2002) (establishing the Expert Group on Technology Transfer).
States.107  An exception in the Bayh-Dole Act for 
clean technologies will benefit clean technology 
patent owners in the United States by permitting out-
sourced labor and production to reduce the overall 
cost of commercialization of a technology.  Given 
current U.S. unemployment rates, it will be politically 
unpopular to suggest that manufacturing jobs of clean 
technologies should be moved to a developing country.  
But developed nations like the United States would 
be better served focusing on jobs creation in the areas 
of clean technology research and development, rather 
than manufacturing.  The United States’ advantage 
over many other nations lies in the exportation of 
intellectual property knowledge, not exportation of 
manufactured goods.
Incentives have been successfully used in 
the past to spark innovation in underdeveloped 
technologies, or to give a competitive advantage to 
areas already developed.  Ethanol subsidies in the 
U.S., and petroleum subsidies in Venezuela and 
Russia, are examples of ways to reduce pricing in a 
particular technological area.  Prizes, like the X Prize 
for space flight, can inspire and mobilize technology 
innovators.108 Public funds and grants for research and 
development such as the California Public Utilities 
Commission Solar Initiative and Sustainable Energy 
USA awards can help grow a technology sector.109 
Developing nations can implement similar incentives to 
help growth in the clean technology sectors.  
In addition to incentives to develop 
endogenous technology, developing nations should use 
national incentives to encourage investment in clean 
technology transfer.  Both positive incentives, such 
as prizes or subsidies, and negative incentives, such 
as carbon taxes, can tip the balance in favor of clean 
technologies.  Without such monetary incentives, the 
gap with fossil fuels in competitive pricing will only be 
reduced by innovation.  This will lead to long delays 
in the adoption of clean technologies on a large scale, 
while further harm is done to the environment.  If a 
successful exchange of technology can take place, the 
benefits can simulate the advantages of foreign direct 
investment: a developing country gains improved clean 
technology sectors and the knowledge and skills for 
their own future development.  In the long term, the 
level of competition and global market demand will 
increase and the developing nation can use the global 
IP system to strengthen its own economy.  
Incentives can also be linked to the green 
technology packages.  An incentive would help 
107.  See Bayh-Dole Patent and Trademark Laws Amendment 
Act, Pub. L. No. 96-517, 94 Stat. 3015 (1980).
108.  Kammen, supra note 11, at 343 (calling for a sustainable 
energy award in the U.S.).
109.  Id.
16 Summer 2011
subsidize the purchase of a green technology package by 
a developing nation or work cooperatively to provide 
any necessary infrastructure improvements.  For 
example, a guaranteed update to a developing nation’s 
local power grid might be offered to a firm licensing the 
technology to build a wind or solar field.  Developed 
nations could also make public funds contingent on the 
formation of green technology packages.  Hence, if a 
firm receives research dollars from the government and 
that research leads to patenting and commercialization, 
the firm could be required to offer a green technology 
package at a competitive price.  If a developing nation 
desires a green technology package, the IP rights holder 
would still receive a royalty on the license and a public 
image boost for the spread of green technology.
 One problem with incentives is the balance 
of technologies.  Since incentives are designed to 
disturb the natural balance, care should be used 
in deciding which clean technologies will receive 
benefits.  Developing nations should choose only the 
most efficient green technology package based on the 
nation’s local constraints.  A loss of efficiency results 
in waste and misplaced incentives to green technology 
package providers.  Appropriate time limitations on 
subsidies would also help to ensure that the choice of 
technologies is flexible and to prevent dependence on a 
single technology.
 Another issue to consider is the role of IP 
in light of green technology packages and national 
incentives.  The stability and strength of an IP legal 
system could affect the relative pricing of a developing 
nation consumer.  Some nations may appear riskier 
than others based on weak IP enforcement or 
unfavorable national IP laws.  China, for example, has a 
reputation of being a risky country to invest in because 
of favoritism towards its citizens.110 In China, unlike 
many other countries, the licensor may have no rights 
to any improvements made by a licensee.111 A green 
technology package to China may be more expensive as 
a result of this favoritism.  This may, in turn, encourage 
China to establish a more balanced IP system for 
foreigners. 
XI.   Conclusion
 The most significant aspect of green technology 
packages is the quid pro quo – climate change 
adaptation and mitigation technologies in exchange 
for potential profits for IPR holders and innovators.  
The global IP regime can be used as a resource in 
gathering information and facilitating licensing.  The 
110.  See Mei Gechlik, Making Transfer of Clean Technology 
Work: Lessons of the Clean Development Mechanism, 11 San Diego 
Int’l L.J. 227, 263 (2009). 
111.  Copenhagen Economics, supra note 48, at §4.1.28.
international community should direct efforts toward 
reducing the barriers that impede these transactions 
and work to develop a strong clean technology market.  
Groups like the CTC can help identify potential 
developing nation consumers and pair them with clean 
technology providers. Governments can limit domestic 
barriers that impede transfer of clean technologies 
and incentivize development of clean technologies. 
Though economic conditions or political pressures may 
galvanize a united movement toward alternative energy 
solutions, appeals to nations through profit may be 
more effective than an appeal to a sense of the public 
welfare.  Green technology packages and corresponding 
incentives can appeal to both and, therefore, make 
promising mechanisms for promoting environmentally 
sound technologies in the developing world.
